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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the District Court certified as final the
orders appealed from.

Appellate jurisdiction is

conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Utah Code § 78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

In August 2 006, Lorin and Dianne Leavitt

("Leavitts") contracted with GDE Construction, Inc.
("GDE") to perform certain remodeling work on their
home and property.

(R4 05; First Amended Verified

Complaint, 2)
2.

The terms of the agreement were that the

Leavitts would pay GDE on a cost plus basis, paying for
GDE's costs and 15% for profit and overhead. (R405)
3.

The Leavitts contend that the 15% included

labor to be performed by GDE.

(R4 05) GDE contends that

labor was to be billed separately. (R560)
4.

GDE began work on the project in October 2006.

(R1084)
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5.

By the beginning of 2007, the Leavitts had

requested substantially more work than originally
contemplated and the cost of the project increased.
(R1084)
6.

In February 2007, the Leavitts obtained a

construction loan from Bank of American Fork ("BAF") in
the amount of $1,137,000 ("First Construction Loan").
(R1102)
7.

As a condition of approving the loan, BAF

required that GDE sign as guarantor a "Guaranty of
Completion and Performance" dated February 9, 2007.
GDE signed the guaranty. (R1102)
8.

BAF approved the First Construction Loan and

disbursed the loan proceeds to GDE, as requested,
during the next several months. (R1102)
9.

Between February and October 2007, the cost

and scope of the project increased again, and the
proceeds from the First Construction Loan ran out.
(R1084)
10.

In or about October 2007, Lorin Leavitt met

with GDE's principals, Don and Amy Eldredge to discuss
the status of the project and how to proceed. (R1084)
6
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15. In its First Lien GDE claims it ufurnished the
first labor, materials and/or equipment on October 10,
2006 and furnished the last labor, materials and/or
equipment on April 30, 2008." (R1084)
16. After GDE recorded the First Lien, the
Leavitts informed. GDE that the lien was preventing them
from obtaining permanent financing on the property.

As

evidence of this fact, the Leavitts presented GDE with
a letter from CityWide Home Loans indicating that the
lien was preventing them from obtaining permanent
financing. (R2029)
17. Four days after the Leavitts informed GDE that
the First Lien was preventing them from obtaining
permanent financing, GDE presented the Leavitts with a
"Promissory Note with Confession of Judgment (Secured
by Trust Deed against Real Property)" ("GDE Note").
(R1084) The GDE Note was secured by a trust deed
recorded against certain property owned by the
Leavitts, however, GDE's trust deed was superseded by
previously-recorded interests on that property such
that the property had no equity with which to pay GDE's
trust deed. (R2025)
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23. GDE did not perform any new work on the
Project from the time of recording of the First Lien to
the time of recording the Second Lien. (R1102)
24 . The Leavitts and BAF contend that Amy Eldredge
recorded the Second Lien on the Leavitt home because
the GDE Note, secured by the GDE Trust Deed, was not
paid. (R1102)
25. GDE contends that it recorded the Second Lien
because no payment was made toward the balance due to
GDE for the work performed on the project. (R2029)
26. On July 16, 2 008, GDE further recorded on the
Leavitt home an "Amended Lien to Suupercede [sic] Lien
Recorded on June 25, 2 008, Utah County Recorder Number
73098:2008" in the principal amount of $563,690.45
("Amended Lien").

GDE amended the lien to include the

total amount due on the project, including amounts owed
to subcontractors.

Some of the subcontractors asserted

claims for breach of contract against GDE, and GDE
disclaimed any obligation to pay those subcontractors
in those respective actions. (R1102)
27. On August 18, 2008, a Notice of Default and
Election to Sell ("Notice of Default") for the GDE
10

Trust Deed was recorded on the St. George Property.
(R560)
28. Also on August 18, 2008, GDE filed the instant
action naming Ms. Leavitt, BAF and other lien claimants
as defendants. (R12)
29. In its First Amended Complaint filed November
6, 2008 ("Amended Complaint"), GDE brought claims for,
as against Mrs. Leavitt, (1) breach of contract, (2)
quantum meruit/contract implied in fact, (3) quantum
meruit/contract implied in law, each in the total
principal amount of $563,690.23, and, as against all
parties, (4) to foreclose its Amended Lien, with a
deficiency judgment as against Mrs. Leavitt for any
resulting deficiency following foreclosure of its
Amended Lien. (R2 0)
30. The Leavitts filed a counterclaim, and
additionally sought a temporary restraining order
preventing GDE from proceeding to foreclosure on the
property secured by the GDE Note on the basis that it
was fraudulently entered into and enforced. (R104,
R359, R405)
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31. The parties conducted discovery, including
taking the depositions of the principals of GDE and the
Leavitts.
32. After discovery closed, the Leavitts filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting that the GDE Note
constituted an accord and satisfaction and that GDE's
claims must be dismissed and requesting 54(b)
certification of whatever order the trial court
entered. (R1084)
33. BAF also filed a motion for summary judgment,
duplicating many of Leavitts arguments, and
additionally asserting that the Guaranties require GDE
to release its lien claims and settle the other lien
claims on the project. (R1102)
34. GDE opposed the Leavitts' motion on several
bases: 1) that the GDE Note was void under the doctrine
of mutual mistake because both parties believed that
release of the lien would lead to permanent financing,
and it did not; 2) that there was no accord and
satisfaction; and 3) that the release of the First Lien
was invalid because no payment was made.

12

(R2025) GDE

submitted a declaration of Amy Eldredge in opposition
to the motion. (R2029)
35. GDE opposed BAF's motion, reiterating its
defenses from its opposition to the Leavitts' motion,
and also asserting that the Guaranties are
unenforceable under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute.
(Utah Code § 38-1-1, et seq.)

(R1929)

36. BAF and the Leavitts filed motions to strike
the affirmative defense of mutual mistake as it was not
adequately pled and to strike the Declaration of Amy
Eldredge, arguing that paragraph 5 of the Declaration
contradicted her prior deposition testimony and relied
on inadmissible hearsay within hearsay.

(R 2059, 2126)

The offending statement is, "I was told by the Leavitts
that the only condition precedent to the granting of a
loan by Citywide Home Loans was the release of the
First Lien." (R2029)
37. GDE opposed the motion to strike the
affirmative defense, relying on the following language
from GDE's answer to the Leavitt's Amended Verified
Complaint: "GDE specifically pleads the defenses of
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
13

laches, license, payment, release, statute of frauds,
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense as may be disclosed through
discovery."

(Emphasis added.)

Alternatively, GDE

requested that it be granted leave to amend its answer
under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Finally, GDE opposed the motion to strike the
Declaration of Amy Eldredge, arguing that there was no
inconsistency and that the testimony did not rely on
hearsay within hearsay. (R2166, 2181)
38. After the parties fully briefed the motions,
the Court held oral argument which substantially
followed the briefing.

On October 26, 2010, the Court

issued a written ruling granting in part the motions to
strike and granting BAF and the Leavitts' motions for
summary judgment.

(R2230) The ruling was later reduced

to two written orders to which GDE objected, and BAF
and the Leavitts replied. (R2288, 2285, 2305, 2344)
These orders contained language certifying them as
final under Rule 54(b).

(R2321, 2391) BAF did not

object to these orders.
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39. The Order on the motions to strike was entered
on November 29, 2 010, and the Order on the motions for
summary judgment was entered on December 9, 2010.
(2321, 2391)
40. GDE filed a request for reconsideration or
clarification on November 26, 2010, which was fully
briefed.

(R2313) The Court denied GDE's request for

reconsideration on January 4, 2011. (R2471)
41. BAF, the Leavitts, and a subcontractor who had
entered into a settlement agreement with GDE (Noorda
Architectural Metals, Inc.) immediately began
collection and enforcement actions against GDE.
42. On January 28, 2011, GDE filed a motion to set
aside the judgments, request for 54(b) certification,
and for an extension of time to file a notice of
appeal.

(R2534)

43. On February 1, 2011, GDE filed a notice of
appeal. (R2577)
44. On February 7, 2011, before the parties had
fully briefed GDE's motion, the Court granted GDE's
request for 54 (b) certification and for an extension of
time to file a notice of appeal.
15

(R2624)

45. Collection actions proceeded before the
District Court until March 15, 2011, when Judge Hansen
ordered a stay of all proceedings pending the outcome
of the appeal. (R3341)
46. BAF filed a motion for summary disposition of
this appeal, arguing that: 1) the notice of appeal was
untimely; 2) that GDE's docketing statement was
deficient; and 3) that the orders appealed from were
improperly certified under Rule 54 (b) .

In an Order

filed April 26, 2011, this Court denied BAF's motion as
to the first two grounds on the merits, and deferred
consideration of the certification issue.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

Jurisdiction

BAF argues that these Orders were improperly
certified under Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The proposed orders submitted jointly by

BAF and the Leavitts included language certifying them
as final under Rule 54(b), and BAF did not object at
that time and has waived that argument.
However, in the event this Court reaches the
merits of that issue, GDE asserts that the three
16

elements required for proper interlocutory
certification are met: 1) there must be multiple claims
for relief or multiple parties to the action; 2) the
decision would be final as to the claim on which it is
rendered; and 3) there is no just reason for delay.
Here, all three elements are met: there are at least
three remaining parties in this litigation; the
decisions rendered by the Court fully dispose of the
claims on which they were rendered; and there is no
just reason for delay.

Indeed, BAF itself seems to

believe that the Order is final, as it has begun
collection actions against GDE, which could not be
commenced absent a final order.
II. Motions to Strike
A.

Paragraph 5 of the Eldredge Declaration is

admissible.
The trial court struck Paragraph 5 on the basis
that it contains hearsay within hearsay.

However,

first level of hearsay - the statement by CityWide - is
not being offered for the truth of the matter, but only
for the effect on the listener.
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The second level of

hearsay - the statement by the Leavitts - is a party
admission under Rule 801(d)(2).
B.

The affirmative defense of mutual mistake was
adequately pled. Alternatively, the trial
court erred in failing to grant GDE leave to
amend its answer to include mutual mistake.

GDE's catchall statement adequately incorporated
mutual mistake.

Alternatively, because the trial had

not commenced, and because the assertion of the defense
of mutual mistake would not have necessitated
additional discovery, the trial court erred in failing
to grant GDE leave to amend its complaint, either
expressly or impliedly by consent of the parties.
III. The parties did not reach an accord and
satisfaction.
The three elements of accord and satisfaction are:
1) the amount is unliquidated and disputed; 2) payment
is made on the amount; 3) that the creditor accept
payment as satisfaction of the debt.
none of the three elements are met.

In this case,
First, GDE alleged

that the amount was undisputed, as discussed by the
parties during the October meeting.

Second, the

promissory note was never intended by the parties to be
payment of any kind as evidenced by the lack of a
18

$10,000 down payment and no collection under the note.
Furthermore, the note could not serve as payment unless
honored.

Third, GDE never accepted the note as payment

in full.
IV. The Guaranties of Completion are unenforceable
under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute.
The First Guaranty of Completion was executed in
February 2 007, before the enactment of § 38-1-39, and
is thus expressly invalid and contrary to Utah's
Mechanic's lien law (See § 38-1-29) as held by this
Court in Olsen

v.

Chase,

2011 UT App 181.

The Second Guaranty of Completion, executed in
December 2007, is also invalid as it runs afoul of the
above-stated provision forbidding any private attempts
to change the nature of lien rights except as expressly
provided for in the Code.

Additionally, it fails to

comply with the requirements of Utah Code § 38-1-39,
which requires that all lien releases and waivers
conform to a certain format and be founded upon payment
of the amount due.

Because GDE did not receive payment

for its execution of the Second Guaranty, nor does it
comply with the form required by Section 39, the Second
Guaranty is unenforceable.
19

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question of 54(b) certification is a
jurisdictional question that is reviewed by this Court
at its own discretion.

Miller

2002 UT 6, H 18, 44 P.3d 663.

v.

USAA Cas.

Ins.

Co.,

The issue of proper

certification is a question of law reviewed for
correctness.

Kennecott

Corp.

v.

Utah State

Tax

Comm'n,

814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991) .
Because this matter comes before the Court on
competing motions for summary judgment, all factual
inferences are taken in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party - Appellant GDE.

u

An appellate court

reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate
grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party."

Orvis

v.

Johnson,

2008 UT 2, 1 6, 177 P.3d

600.
ARGUMENT
GDE argues that jurisdiction is proper in this
Court as the Orders were properly certified and BAF
waived any argument in opposition to their
20

certification by failing to file any objection to the
Orders.
On the merits, GDE appeals three issues: 1)
whether the trial court properly struck the defense of
mutual mistake and portions of the Declaration of Amy
Eldredge; 2) whether the trial court properly found
that there was an accord and satisfaction between the
Leavitts and GDE; and 3) whether the trial court
properly ruled that the First and Second Guaranties are
enforceable against GDE.
I.

THE ORDERS APPEALED FROM ARE PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear all appeals
from final orders.

This jurisdiction extends to orders

that are certified as final under Rule 54 (b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

For 54(b) certification

to be proper, only three elements need be met: 1) there
must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties
to the action; 2) the decision would be final as to the
claim on which it is rendered; and 3) there is no just
reason for delay.

Powell

v.

(Utah 2008).

21

Cannon,

179 P.3d 799, 807

Here, all three requirements are met.

The claims

which are the subject of this appeal are the Leavitt's
defense to all of GDE's claims on the basis of accord
and satisfaction (the trial court dismissed GDE's
complaint as a result), BAF's breach of contract claim
under the guaranty (which was granted in its entirety),
and the subsequent awards of attorneys' fees as a
result of the previous orders.

These orders fully

dispose of the various claims to which they pertain,
leaving the remainder of the case intact.

This matter

is ripe for appeal.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS
TO STRIKE THE DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE AND
THE DECLARATION OF AMY ELDREDGE.

A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PARAGRAPH 5
OF THE ELDREDGE DECLARATION.
In response to BAF and the Leavitts' motions for
summary judgment, GDE filed an opposition that included
a declaration of Amy Eldredge, a principal of GDE.
the declaration, Amy sought to clarify what the
Leavitts had argued regarding the effect of the
CityWide letter.

Amy stated: "I was told by the

Leavitts that the only condition precedent to the

22

In

granting of a loan by Citywide Home Loans was the
release of the First Lien."
BAF and the Leavitts filed motions to strike this
statement on the basis that it contained hearsay within
hearsay and was inadmissible.

The consideration of

evidentiary objections is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial court.

Here, the trial court

improperly granted the motion.

Rule 8 05 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence forbids the use of hearsay within
hearsay.

To be admissible, a statement must either not

be hearsay or fall into one of the exceptions of the
hearsay rule.
The first level of hearsay here is the statement
by CityWide to the Leavitts that the lien was a bar to
permanent financing.

This statement is not being

offered for the truth of the matter - to wit, whether
the CityWide would actually fund the loan if the lien
was released, but rather, for the effect on the
listener, i.e. whether or not the Leavitts and GDE
believed that CityWide would fund the loan if the lien
was removed.

Whether or not CityWide would actually
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comply with the letter is immaterial for hearsay
purposes.
The second level of hearsay is the statement by
the Leavitts to GDE, restating the CityWide letter.
However, the statement is not hearsay.

Rule 801(d)(2)

of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that a statement
is not hearsay if: "the statement is offered against a
party and is (A) the party's own statement../7

Because

the Leavitts are a party and it is their own statement,
it is not hearsay and the trial court erred in ruling
that it was. Accordingly, GDE respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling and
order that the statement be admitted into the record.
B, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE DEFENSE
OF MUTUAL MISTAKE.
In both its Verified Answer and its Answer to the
First Amended Complaint of Lorin and Dianne Leavitt,
GDE included the following language, "GDE specifically
pleads the defenses of estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, laches, license,
payment, release, statute of frauds, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense
as may be disclosed through discovery."
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As discovery

progressed, GDE was able to piece together the evidence
showing that the parties believed that the long-term
financing would go through and pay GDE's general
contractor fee.

These facts were established through

the various depositions, including the depositions of
Don and Amy Eldredge which were conducted near the
close of discovery.

Now that the facts supporting

GDE's mutual mistake argument have been developed,
GDE's "catchall" defense is triggered, including mutual
mistake.

Additionally, GDE is entitled to amend its

pleadings to include the affirmative defense of mutual
mistake.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

states:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment; but failure to so amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.
Rule 15 has been interpreted to include the affirmative
defense of mutual mistake of fact.
correctly cites Mabey v. Kay Peterson
25

Opposing counsel
Const.

Co.,

Inc.,

682 P.2d 287 (1984) in support of the Leavitts'
position that mutual mistake must be affirmatively
pled.

However, as the court points out when discussing

mutual mistake in. Mabey,

"It is true that when issues

not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings."
289.

Id.

at

Accordingly, to the extent necessary, GDE

affirmatively requests that the Court grant leave to
amend its pleadings to include the affirmative defense
of mutual mistake.
There is ample cause in this case to allow the
amendment.

The Leavitts' argument that the promissory

note constituted an accord and satisfaction had not
been previously raised.

Accordingly, GDE could not

have anticipated this argument (at least in the form
appearing in their motion for summary judgment), and
thus GDE should be allowed to raise the affirmative
defense of mutual mistake.

Furthermore, there is no

prejudice to the Leavitts.

The facts surrounding

mutual mistake have already been developed and there is
no need for further discovery.
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GDE respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
decision to strike the defense of mutual mistake and
allow the issue to go to trial.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT GDE'S
CLAIM WAS SATISFIED BY AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION.
The elements of accord and satisfaction are: 1)
that the amount is unliquidated and disputed; 2) that
payment is made in satisfaction of the debt; and 3)
that the creditor accept the payment as full
Smith

satisfaction.

v. Grand

Canyon

84 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Utah 2003).

Expeditions

Co.,

However, the

undisputed facts of this case show that none of the
three elements were met.
The amount at issue here is liquidated and
undisputed.

The dispute, to the extent there was on at

the time of execuition of the Promissory Note and Trust
Deedk, involved how the payment to the subcontractors
would be made.

Leavitts felt it necessary to have GDE

release its lien so they could pay the amount owing on
the project.

The GDE Note served only to facilitate

permanent financing and was never meant to be payment.
If the Leavitts had paid the amount stated in the note,
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which corresponded with the amount stated in GDE's
First Lien, then the lien would have been released and
no further action would have been required.
Additionally, because the Leavitts never paid the down
payment of $10,000, and because they never paid
anything else under the Note, it is clear from the
evidence that it was never meant to be enforceable.
More importantly is the fact that the Leavitts
have expressly disclaimed any obligation to pay under
the Note, and indeed, sought a temporary restraining
order preventing GDE's action to foreclose.

Because

this is a motion for summary judgment, all facts must
be taken in the light most favorable to GDE.

While it

may seem contradictory for GDE to rely on a fact that a
note it holds may not be enforceable, that is the
conclusion that must be drawn by this judge overseeing
this case in this court.

Because the Leavitts disclaim

any obligation to pay under the Note, claiming that it
was fraudulently entered into, then the trial court
should have concluded that the Note is unenforceable
and that GDE's version of the facts is correct: the
Note was never intended to be payment and thus could
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not have release GDE's mechanic's lien and contract
claims.
IV.

THE GUARANTIES OF COMPLETION ARE UNENFORCEABLE
UNDER UTAH'S MECHANICS LIEN STATUTE.

BAF's main argument is that GDE is bound by the
two documents entitled "Guaranty of Completion and
Performance" which were signed by GDE contemporaneously
with BAF's approval of the Leavitts' two construction
loans.

In its motion, BAF seeks to enforce the

indemnification and subordination language of the
Guaranty, which is as follows:
GUARANTY: Guarantor hereby unconditionally and
absolutely warrants and guarantees to Lender
that:... (c) except for Lender's security
agreements, the Project will be constructed
and completed free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances, including without limitation all
mechanics' liens, materialman's liens and
equitable liens; ...
BAF seeks enforcement of this provision through
specific performance as well as an award of attorneys'
fees associated with this action.
A.
CURRENT UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT SUBORDINATION
AGREEMENTS BE ACCOMPANIED BY PAYMENT TO BE ENFORCEABLE.
After the trial court ruled on this motion, and
before this brief was drafted, this Court issued its
decision in Olsen

v.

Chase,

2011 UT App 181.
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In

Olsen,

this Court held that subordination agreements executed
prior to March 31, 2007 (the effective date of Utah
Code § 38-1-39) are prohibited by statute and
unenforceable.

Id.

at H 14.

This Court did not rule

on what requirements must be met for a subordination
agreement to be valid if executed after that date.1 GDE
maintains that such agreements must comply with the
express requirements of Section 39, including requiring
that any change in lien rights be accompanied by
payment for service rendered.
BAF cites to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision

in Ellsworth

Paulsen

Construction

Co. V. 51-SPR,

LLC,

144 P.3d 261 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 183 P.3d 248
(Utah 2008) .

In Ellsworth,

a property owner contracted

with a general contractor to build two office
buildings.

The property owner entered into a separate

agreement with an investor to obtain financing for the

1 GDE notes that the Utah State Legislature in the
Spring 2 011 General Session passed a number of changes
to the Mechanic's Lien law, including a provision that
brings the statute in harmony with this Court's ruling
in Olsen and GDE's interpretation of the statute. The
new changes (Utah Code § 38-1-1, et seq. 2011) now
expressly provide that a construction lender must buy
out the priority of a senior lienholder in order to
maintain a lien right.
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project.

At intervals during the project, general

contractor would submit invoices to the lender for
payment.

The lender would then pay those invoices when

the general contractor signed an attached waiver of
lien and indemnification which contains language which
is substantially similar to the language of the
Guaranty at issue in this case. At some point during
the project, the property owner began diverting funds
away from the project and began to get behind in paying
the general contractor.

Despite not being paid, the

general contractor continued working for some time
until the owner disappeared.

At that point, the

general contractor learned of the involvement of the
investor and sought payment directly from them.

The

investor refused payment and the general contractor
filed a lien against the project and sought
foreclosure.
The investor asserted the defense of waiver of
lien and indemnification against claims made by
subcontractors (which had been paid separately by
investor) based on the various agreements signed by the
general contractor as it was paid.
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The trial court

ruled that the lien waivers were valid, but refused to
apply the guaranty and indemnification language.

Both

parties appealed.2
The Court of Appeals held that the lien waivers
were valid and enforceable, finding that when the
general contractor signed the waivers, it was agreeing
to the express guaranty language included in those
agreements.

The Court stated, "Likewise, when the

guaranty and warranty language of the lien waiver
provisions is properly construed in the context of the
lien waiver agreement, those provisions are valid and
enforceable."

Id.

at 273 (emphasis added).

It is clear from this ruling that a guaranty and
warranty provision is only enforceable if it is given
in conjunction with payment.

("Here, as part of the

valid lien waiver provisions, the applicability of the
indemnity and guaranty language hinges on the relevant
draw dates for each check, as is so with the specific
lien waiver language itself."

Id.

at 273.)

Thus, if

the general contractor has not been paid, then it
2

There were several other issues in the case
including joint venture which are not relevant to this
argument.
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cannot be bound to indemnify the lender against nonpayment to other parties.
This holding is in perfect harmony with Utah's
mechanic's lien statute.

The statute, which is to be

construed so as to protect the contractor's right to
lien {Bailey

v.

Call,

767 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah App.

1989)), clearly states that a lien waiver cannot be
enforced unless it is given after the lien right has
arisen and in conjunction with payment of the amount
waived or released.

See U.C.A. § 38-1-39.

BAF would have this Court hold the opposite, that
a contractor can be bound to pay its subcontractors or
even other materialman with whom it has no contract,
even if the general contractor has not been paid by the
owner.

This result is contrary to the longstanding

practice of obtaining lien waivers in conjunction with
progress payments which has been upheld by the courts
and codified by the state legislature.
Here, it is undisputed that GDE has not been paid
any money for the amounts claimed by the various other
lienholders, nor has any party contended that GDE has
retained funds paid to it which should have been
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disbursed to its subcontractors or any entity who
performed work on the project.

Therefore, GDE cannot

be bound by the language of the guaranty until it has
been paid.

BAF's action to enforce the guaranty is

premature and should not be sustained.
B. THE GUARANTY OF COMPLETION AND PERFORMANCE IS
NOT BINDING ON GDE.
In addition to the reasons stated above, the
Guaranty cannot be enforced against GDE at this point
because it fails to meet even the most basic contract
principles.

Foremost among these, is the lack of

consideration between the parties.

In the cases cited

by BAF, the extension of credit is sufficient
consideration for the guaranty agreements to be
enforceable.

However, as explained above, in each of

those cases, the guarantor was a principal of the
borrower.

In this case, GDE has no relationship with

the Leavitts beyond the construction contract.

If for

some reason the Leavitts fail to pay on the
construction contract, GDE still has a right to
recovery against the Leavitts.

In the cases described

above, an investor has no right to recovery against his
company if the company fails to turn a profit.
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Thus,

the investor only receives the benefit of the loan if
the company succeeds.

Here, GDE is entitled to be paid

independent of whether or not that money comes from BAF
or some other source.

Thus, there is no consideration

between BAF and GDE.
Furthermore, the agreement is completely onesided.

If BAF is successful, it gets the entire

benefit of the agreement, while GDE gets nothing from
BAF.

This is made clear by the express language of the

agreement which states, "As a condition and inducement
to making the Loan, Borrower has requested that
Guarantor duly execute and deliver this
Guaranty...which [is] considered by Lender to be
material regarding Lender's decision to make the loan."
The benefit of the agreement flows from BAF to the
Leavitts through BAF's decision to make the loan, but
BAF has no obligation to pay GDE unless the Leavitts
approve the payments.

Indeed, if both the Leavitts and

BAF are successful on their claims, BAF will have
obtained the benefit of a lien-free project, the
Leavitts will have obtained the benefit of GDE's work,
and GDE will be left with the burden of paying all of
35

the subcontractors and other lien claimants.

Such an

outcome is contrary to principles of equity and justice
and the trial court's decision should be reversed.
C. THERE ARE MATERIAL DISPUTES OF FACT WHICH
PRECLUDE GRANTING BAF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Underlying BAF's argument in many places is the
contention that GDE disclaims any contract with several
of the contractors included in the Amended Lien, as
well as the other contractor parties to this case.
This arrangement which arises due to the nature of the
construction industry, necessarily implicates the
intervention of a factfinder.

If GDE is correct, the

Leavitts are responsible for payment of the amounts
owed to those contractors.

If the Leavitts and BAF are

correct, then GDE is responsible to pay those
subcontractors.

However, BAF's argument relies on both

versions of the facts being true: that GDE is
responsible to pay off the other contractor liens, but
also that GDE has no right to lien for that work.

This

paradox cannot be resolved unless there is a factual
determination regarding the respective obligations of
the parties, which as clearly outlined in both the
statement of facts above and in the statement of facts
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in GDE's response to the Leavitts' motion for summary
judgment, are heavily disputed by the testimony of the
parties.

Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate

at this time and the trial court's decision should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
In light of the facts and arguments set forth
above, GDE respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Leavitts and BAF, reverse the trial
court's order striking the defense of mutual mistake
and paragraph 5 of the Eldredge Declaration, and remand
this matter for trial on the merits.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2011.
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.

iel\R. Widdison
Attorney for the GDE
Construction , Inc.
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in GDE's response to the Leavitts' motion for summary
judgment, are heavily disputed by the testimony of the
parties.

Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate

at this time and the trial court's decision should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
In light of the facts and arguments set forth
above, GDE respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Leavitts and BAF, reverse the trial
court's order striking the defense of mutual mistake
and paragraph 5 of the Eldredge Declaration, and remand
this matter for trial on the merits.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2011.
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.

Daniel R. Widdison
Attorney for the GDE
Construction , Inc.
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38-1-29. No waiver of rights — Exception - Payment applied first to preconstruction service lien.
(1) (a) A right or privilege under this chapter may not be waived or limited by contract.
(b) A provision of a contract purporting to waive or limit a right or privilege under this chapter is void.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a claimant may waive or limit, in whole or in part, a lien right under this
chapter in consideration of payment as provided in Section 38-1-39.
(3) Unless an agreement waiving or limiting a lien right expressly provides that a payment is required to be
applied to a specific lien, mortgage, or encumbrance, a payment to a person claiming or included within a
preconstruction service lien and a construction service lien shall be applied first to the preconstruction service lien
until paid in full.
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 339, 2011 General Session
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38-1-39. Waiver or impairment of a lien right — Forms — Scope.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including:
(i) a check;
(ii) a draft;
(iii) an order; or
(iv) other instrument.
(b) "Depository institution" is as defined in Section 7-1-103.
(c) "Lien claimant" means a person that claims a lien under this chapter.
(d) "Receives payment" means, in the case of a restrictive endorsement, a payee has endorsed a check and the
check is presented to and paid by the depository' institution on which it is drawn.
(2) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-29. a written consent given by a lien claimant that waives or limits the lien
claimant's lien rights is enforceable only if the lien claimant:
(a) (i) executes a waiver and release that is signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; or
(ii) for a restrictive endorsement on a check, includes a restrictive endorsement on a check that is:
(A) signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; and
(B) in substantially the same form set forth in Subsection (4)(d); and
(b) receives payment of the amount identified in the waiver and release or check that includes the restrictive
endorsement:
(i) including payment by a joint payee check; and
(ii) for a progress payment, only to the extent of the payment.
(3) (a) Notwithstanding the language of a waiver and release described in Subsection (2), Subsection (3)(b)
applies if:
(i) the payment given in exchange for any waiver and release of lien is made by check; and
(ii) the check fails to clear the depository institution on which it is drawn for any reason,
(b) If the conditions of Subsection (3)(a) are met:
(i) the waiver and release described in Subsection (3)(a) is null, void, and of no legal effect; and
(ii) the following will not be affected by the lien claimant's execution of the waiver and release:
(A) any lien;
(B) any lien right;
(C) any bond right;
(D) any contract right; or
(E) any other right to recover payment afforded to the lien claimant in law or equity.
(4) (a) A waiver and release given by a lien claimant meets the requirements of this section if it is in
substantially the form provided in this Subsection (4) for the circumstance provided in this Subsection (4).
(b) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a
waiver and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a progress billing:
"UTAH CONDITIONAL WAIVER AND RELEASE UPON PROGRESS PAYMENT
Property Name:
Property Location:
Undersigned's Customer:
Invoice/Payment Application Number:

Utah Code
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Payment Amount:
Payment Period:
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to
waive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right
under Utah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the
undersigned has on the above described Property once:
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn.
This waiver and release applies to a progress payment for the work, materials, equipment, or a combination of
work, materials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer
which are the subject of the Invoice or Payment Application, but only to the extent of the Payment Amount. This
waiver and release does not apply to any retention withheld; any items, modifications, or changes pending
approval; disputed items and claims; or items furnished or invoiced after the Payment Period.
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned
receives from this progress payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors,
materialmen, and suppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment
that are the subject of this waiver and release.
Dated:
(Company Name)
By:
Its:
"
(c) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a
waiver and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a final billing:
"UTAH WAIVER AND RELEASE UPON FINAL PAYMENT
Property Name:
Property Location:
Undersigned's Customer:
Invoice/Payment Application Number:
Payment Amount:
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to
waive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right
under Utah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the
undersigned has on the above described Property once:
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn.
This waiver and release applies to the final payment for the work, materials, equipment, or combination of
work, materials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer.
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned
receives from the final payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, materialmen,
and suppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment that are the
subject of this waiver and release.
Dated:
(Company Name)
By:
Its:
"
(d) A restrictive endorsement placed on a check to effectuate a waiver and release described in this Subsection
(4) meets the requirements of this section if it is in substantially the following form:
"This check is a progress/ final payment for property described on this check sufficient for identification.
Endorsement of this check is an acknowledgment by the endorser that the waiver and release to which the payment
applies is effective to the extent provided in Utah Code Ann. Subsection 38-l-39f4Yb) or (c) respectively."
(e) (i) If using a restrictive endorsement under Subsection (4)(d), the person preparing the check shall indicate
whether the check is for a progress payment or a final payment by circling the word "progress" if the check is for a
progress payment, or the word "final" if the check is for a final payment.
(ii) If a restrictive endorsement does not indicate whether the check is for a progress payment or a final
payment, it is considered to be for a progress payment.
(5) (a) If the conditions of Subsection (5)(b) are met, this section does not affect the enforcement of:
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(i) an accord and satisfaction regarding a bona fide dispute; or
(ii) an agreement made in settlement of an action pending in any court or arbitration,
(b) Pursuant to Subsection (5)(a), this section does not affect enforcement of an accord and satisfaction or
settlement described in Subsection (5)(a) if the aiccord and satisfaction or settlement:
(i) is in a writing signed by the lien claimant; and
(ii) specifically references the lien rights waived or impaired.
Amended by Chapter 382,2008 General Session
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process
necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to
the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals
has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 344,2009 General Session
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